THE FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY
Sir Francis Vallat
Let me say at the outset that I am going to be a "cold" lawyer on
this subject, that is to say I am going to try to put before you very briefly
the main points of departure, the essential facts as I see them in relation
to the Court. This will then give more opportunity for Mr. Fawcett and
Mr. Gross to follow with comments of assessment or criticism.
I would like to say immediately that I do not regard the Court as a
panacea. Every time a United Kingdom speaker opens his mouth to
mention the settlement of international disputes, it always seems to be
assumed that one is going "for the Court, the whole Court and nothing
but the Court." This is certainly not the view I take. There are many
other instruments for the promotion of international relations and for
the settlement of international disputes. I need only refer in that context
to what is said in article 33 of the Charter itself.
In spite of the shortness of time, let me just put the present Court a
little into its historical context. The history of the development of the
International Court really began with the Hague Conferences of 1899
and 1907, when it was felt that the world had had too much of the
assertion of policies by the use of force and that states should seek the
settlement of their disputes by means of arbitration, which would have
a largely judicial character. It was recognized that arbitration could be
a procedure which was more or less ex aequo et bono or could be carried
out judicially. I think it is fair to say that some of the creators of the
Permanent Court were over-optimistic about the possibility of solving
questions of war and peace in that way, and this is a lesson that we
should have learned by now.
Nevertheless, since the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration down to the present time, there has been a more or less steady
flow of litigation, first before tribunals established under the Permanen't
Court of Arbitration, then before the Permanent Court of International
Justice, and since the establishment of the United Nations, before the
International Court of Justice. The cases have had both legal and political significance, and I make no apology for mentioning "political" and
"legal" aspects. I worked for nearly a quarter of a century in the For[551
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eign and Commonwealth Office as an independent, professional lawyer-with I hope no damage to my moral fiber!-and during that time
I had to exercise a discipline which was a recognition of the distinction
between what were regarded as political factors for my Ministers and
legal factors which were primarily for the legal advisers. To the best of
my ability, I advised on what I regarded as the legal factors. So I make
no apologies for saying that the cases had both legal and political aspects-some had more legal than political significance, and others more
political than legal significance.
Let me recall just a few of the cases that came before the Tribunals
which I have mentioned. They are familiar to all of you, I know, but I
have taken five at random to illustrate the point I am making.
These are my examples:
(1) The Island of Palmas Case' decided by the award of Max Huber
acting within the context of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. There
is not one among you, I venture to suggest, who has not at some time
had to weigh the legal significance of the award of Max Huber in the
Island of Palmas Case.
(2) From the Permanent Court of International Justice, the S.S.
Wimbledon Case:2 a case of great legal and political significance at the
time that it was decided.
(3) In the early 1930's, the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court
on the Austro/German Customs Union,3 a question of immense political
importance at that time.
(4) In the days of the International Court of Justice, in 1950, the
South- West Africa Advisory Opinion 4 which has been the mainspring
for all the activities of the United Nations with regard to South-West
Africa since that time.
(5) In the field of disputes, the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,5
decided by the International Court of Justice, which again was not only
of great political significance at the time, but has also had very great
legal effect on the development of the law of the sea since that time.
I have chosen at random only five of the cases, and I stand before you
'island of Palmas Case (United States v. The Netherlands), Hague Court Reports 2d (Scott) 83
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
KCase of the S.S. Wimbledon, [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
'Advisory Opinion on the Custom Regime between Austria and Germany, [1931] P.C.I.J., ser.
A/B, No. 41.
'Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South-West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 128.
'Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116.
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today and I say that these cases were of vital importance to international
relations and indirectly made a real contribution to world peace.
I must say, at this point, that I would like to associate myself with
Madam Chairman in referring to the title. I also was a little puzzled by
the addition of the last four words: "The Function of the International
Court of Justice in the World Community." I did not know whether this
was really meant to be a reference to the relevance of the Court to
perhaps the People's Republic of China, North Korea, East Germany,
and the few states who remain outside the family of the United Nations.
I find it very difficult to discuss the role of the International Court in
relation to those entities. What I do find easy is to discuss the role of
the Court in relation to the United Nations; and I am going to take the
United Nations as the world community for this purpose. Again, I do
so with no apology, because this morning we were exhorted as lawyers
to uphold the Charter; and this is absolutely right, of course. We should
look to the Charter as the mainspring of our study and examination of
the function of the International Court in the world community today.
So what I am going to do in the few minutes remaining is to refer very
briefly (just to remind us and have it before us) first to the context of the
Court in the Charter, and secondly to its functions under the Charter.
One starts with the third paragraph of the Preamble: The United
Nations has as one of its main objectives "to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained . . . ." So in the forefront of the Charter we have justice and international law.
Then if we pass on to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter in
chapter 1, the last part of article 1(1) includes among the Purposes
doing certain things "in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law . .. ."
Then I would recall that it is the duty of Members of the United
Nations to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such
a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered." That is, of course, article 2(3) of the Charter.
When we come to look at the specific means for the settlement of
disputes, as I have already pointed out, we have a large range mentioned
in article 33 of the Charter. I would recall also that under article 36(3),
it is part of the duty of the Security Council to take into consideration
that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to
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the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of
the Statute of the Court.
So that is the context of the Court within the framework of the
Charter.
In addition, let us recall that the Court itself is established as a principal organ of the United Nations, and not only that, but under article
92, as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." That is
really the main point, I think, in relation to the Court that one finds in
the Charter: It is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.
Passing very briefly to the functions, I would mention first of all the
advisory functions as set out in article 96 of the Charter and would recall
that the Court is not called upon to advise on political matters; it is
called upon to answer legal questions in response to requests from the
General Assembly or the Security Council, and in the case of requests
from other organs and authorized specialized agencies, legal questions
arising within the scope of their activities. So on the advisory opinions
the Charter has no doubt as to the character of the questions that are
to be put to the Court: They are legal questions, not political questions.
When one turns to contentious jurisdiction, one finds first of all, of
course, that states, and states only, can be parties to the cases before the
Court, and that lifts the matter immediately to the international plane;
secondly, one finds by article 38(1) of the Statute of the Court in the
much forgotten (if I may say so) introductory words that the Court is to
decide disputes on the basis of international law. If I may quote what
article 38 says: "The Court [and this is where the function is defined],
whose function is to decide in accordance with international. law such
disputes as are submitted to it, [etc.] . .. .

So there one finds in the Charter, very briefly and very succinctly
stated, the place in the Organization and the function of the Court; and
I would like to start from this basic proposition that the function of the
Court has three main features: first, international; secondly, legal; and
thirdly, judicial.
I hope these remarks will be a useful starting-point for our discussion.

